A common assumption in the existing network coding literature is that the users are cooperative and do not pursue their own interests. However, this assumption can be violated in practice. In this paper, we analyze inter-session network coding in a wired network using game theory. We assume that the users are selfish and act as strategic players to maximize their own utility, which leads to a resource allocation game among users. In particular, we study network coding with strategic users for the wellknown butterfly network topology where a bottleneck link is shared by several network coding and routing flows. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a wide range of utility functions. We also show that the number of Nash equilibria can be large (even infinite) for certain choices of system parameters. This is in sharp contrast to a similar game setting with traditional packet forwarding where the Nash equilibrium is always unique. We then characterize the worst-case efficiency bounds, i.e., the Price-of-Anarchy (PoA), compared to an optimal and cooperative network design. We show that by using a novel discriminatory pricing scheme which charges encoded and forwarded packets differently, we can improve the PoA in comparison with the case where a single pricing scheme is being used.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal paper by Ahlswede et al. [1] , a rich body of work has been reported on how network coding can improve performance in both wired and wireless networks [2] - [5] .
Network coding can be performed by jointly encoding multiple packets either from the same user or from different users. The former is called intra-session network coding [1] , [2] while the latter is called inter-session network coding [3] - [5] . A common assumption in most network coding schemes in the literature is that the users are cooperative and do not pursue their own interests. However, this assumption can be violated in practice. Therefore, assuming that the users are selfish and strategic, in this paper we ask the following key questions: (a) What is the impact of users' strategic behavior on network performance? (b) How does this impact change with different pricing schemes that we may potentially choose for each link?
It is widely accepted that pricing is an effective approach in terms of improving the efficiency of network resource allocation, especially in distributed settings. In [6] , Kelly et al. showed that if users are price takers (i.e., they treat network prices as fixed), efficient resource allocation can be achieved by properly setting congestion prices on each of the shared links. Recently, Johari et al. studied how the results on efficiency can change in both capacity-constrained [7] and capacity-unconstrained [8] networks if users are price anticipators who realize that the price is directly impacted by each individual user's behavior. In this case, users play a game with each other, and the efficiency of resource allocation is characterized by the Nash equilibrium of the game. A key performance metric is the Price-of-Anarchy (PoA), which measures the worst-case efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium due to users' price anticipating behavior. The PoA is equal to 1 if there is no efficiency loss. A smaller PoA denotes a higher efficiency loss. Other recent work on resource allocation games and the PoA include [9] - [15] . To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous works along this line study price anticipation in network coding systems.
The game theoretic analysis of network coding has received limited attention in the literature, e.g., in [16] - [20] . All results in [16] - [20] focus on the case of intra-session network coding, whereas we consider inter-session network coding in this paper. In [21] , a game theoretic analysis for inter-session network coding of unicast flows in a single bottleneck link is considered. It is shown that in some classes of two-user networks, it is possible to use a rate allocation mechanism to enforce cooperation among users. In this paper, we assume that there are N ≥ 2 users, two of which use network coding while the rest only use routing. This helps us to better understand the interaction between network coding and routing flows. In fact, we show that the performance degrades when both network coding and routing sessions share the same link. Our results are also different from those in [21] since we consider the capacity-unconstrained case instead of the capacity-constrained case as in [21] . In fact, due to the focus on the capacity region of the network coding scheme, the work in [21] did not consider the impact of the utility functions of the users, the cost of the side links, price anticipation, price discrimination, and the PoA.
The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
• New problem formulation: We formulate the problem of maximizing the network aggregate surplus, i.e., the total utility of all users minus the network cost, for inter-session network coding. As far as we know, such a problem has not been studied in the literature before.
• Innovative pricing schemes: We consider two pricing schemes: non-discriminatory pricing and discriminatory pricing. The first one is the traditional approach in networks with routingonly users. It charges all packets with the same price. The second pricing scheme is a novel generalization of the first one where the encoded and forwarded packets are charged with different prices. We show that due to the special properties of network coding, discriminatory pricing is more reasonable in terms of reflecting the actual load generated by each user.
• Characterization of Nash equilibria: We prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the formulated game is always guaranteed; however, there can be many (even infinite) Nash equilibria in the resource allocation game with inter-session network coding.
• Calculation of the PoA in a butterfly network with zero-cost side links: We show that, among the two aforementioned pricing schemes, a properly chosen discriminatory pricing leads to a better PoA compared with the non-discriminatory approach. We also show that the PoA is always smaller (i.e., worse) compared with the case without network coding. In particular, at certain Nash equilibria, the PoA can be as low as 25%, which is less than the well-known result of guaranteed 67% worst-case efficiency in [8] for packet forwarding networks.
• Calculation of the PoA in a butterfly network with non-zero-cost side links: We further show that if the side links in the studied butterfly network topology have non-zero cost, then the PoA can further reduce to only 20%. This occurs due to the fact that in this case none of the users have an incentive to participate in network coding. This implies that if the users have strategic behavior, then it is important to design mechanisms to encourage users to perform network coding; otherwise, we cannot benefit from the advantages of network coding.
The key results of this paper together with a comparison with the related state-of-the-art results without considering network coding in [8] are summarized in Table I .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review some recent results on resource allocation games with routing. In Section III, we extend those results to the case when two users can jointly perform inter-session network coding in a butterfly network where the side links have zero cost. We further extend our analysis to the case where the side links have non-zero cost in Section IV. Conclusions and future work are discussed in Section V. The key notations we used in this paper are summarized in Table II .
II. BACKGROUND: RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME WITH ROUTING FLOWS
In this section, we consider a resource allocation game in which multiple end-to-end users compete to send their packets through a single shared link as in Fig. 1 . By construction, no inter-session network coding is performed in this case. This is a well-known problem which has been widely studied in [6] - [11] . Here, we summarize the key results in [8] , which present the proper terminology and serve as a benchmark for our later discussions.
In Fig. 1 , a set of users N = {1, . . . , N } shares the bottleneck link (i, j) between nodes i and j. All packets that arrive at node i are simply forwarded to node j through link (i, j).
For each user n ∈ N , we denote the transmitter and receiver nodes by s n and t n , respectively. Let x n denote the transmission rate of user n ∈ N . We assume that each user n ∈ N has a utility function U n , representing its degree of satisfaction based on its achievable data rate x n .
On the other hand, the shared link has a cost function C, which depends on the total rate (i.e., n∈N x n ). As in [8] - [10] , we make the following common assumptions throughout this paper: Assumption 1 (Users' Utility Functions): For each user n ∈ N , the utility function U n (x n ) is concave, non-negative, increasing, and differentiable.
Assumption 2 (Link Cost and Price Functions):
There exists a differentiable, convex, and nondecreasing function p(q) over q ≥ 0, with p(0) ≥ 0 and p(q) → ∞ as q → ∞, such that for each q ≥ 0, the cost is modeled as C(q) = q 0 p(z) dz. Here, C(q) is convex and non-decreasing.
In particular, we assume that there exists a > 0 such that p(q) = aq and
That is, the cost function C(q) is quadratic and the price function p(q) is linear. Notice that linear price functions are the only price functions that satisfy the four well-known axioms of rescaling, consistency, additivity, and positivity for cost-sharing systems 1 [9] , [22] .
Assumption 1 is often used to model applications with elastic traffic, e.g., for remote file transfer using the file transfer protocol (FTP) [6] . Examples of utility functions which satisfy Assumption 1 include the well-known class of α-fair utility functions with α ∈ (0, 1) [23] .
Assumption 2 is also a common assumption in the network resource management literature (cf.
[9], [14] , [24] ). In practice, the cost function C may reflect the actual cost (e.g., in dollars) of transmitting units of data over link (i, j) or simply the delay that the packets experience over link (i, j). The more the aggregate data on the link, the higher is the average queueing delay.
Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ). Given complete knowledge and centralized control of the network in Fig. 1 , an efficient rate allocation can be characterized as a solution of the following problem:
Problem 1 (Surplus Maximization with Routing):
The objective function in Problem 1 is the network aggregate surplus [25] . Network aggregate surplus maximization is a common network design objective (cf. [9] , [10] , [14] , [24] ). Clearly, Problem 1 is a convex optimization problem. In general, since the utility functions are local to the users and are not known to each link, efficient resource allocation can be achieved via pricing. Given the rate vector x from the users, the shared link (i, j) can set a single price
for each unit of data rate it carries. Each user n ∈ N then pays x n µ(x) for its data rate x n .
Next, we analyze how the users determine their rates based on the price set by link (i, j).
First, assume that the users are price takers, i.e., they do not anticipate the effect of a change of their rates on the resulting price. In that case, each user n ∈ N selects its rate x n to maximize 1 The first axiom, i.e., rescaling, requires that the prices should be independent of the units of measurement. The second axiom, i.e., consistency, requires that two users having the same effect on the cost should face the same price. The third axiom, i.e., additivity, requires that if the cost function can be decomposed, then so should the price function. Finally, the fourth axiom, i.e., positivity, requires that if the cost is positive, then the price should be at least non-negative. Notice that the last axiom reflects a notion of fairness toward the service provider. [22] .
its own surplus, i.e., utility minus payment, by solving the following local problem [6] :
where U n −1 denotes the inverse of the derivative of utility function U n and price µ is as in (1) .
From the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, if each user n ∈ N selects its rate as in (2) , then the network aggregate surplus is maximized at equilibrium [25, p. 326 ].
Next, we consider price anticipating users: each user can anticipate the effect of its selected data rate on the resulting price. In this case, each user n ∈ N no longer selects its rate as in (2) .
Instead, it strategically selects x n to maximize its surplus given the knowledge that the price µ(x) is set according to (1) and is not fixed. Clearly, the decision made by user n also depends on the rates selected by other users, leading to a resource allocation game among all users:
Game 1 (Resource Allocation Game Among Routing Flows):
• Players: Users in set N .
• Strategies: Transmission rates x for all users.
• Payoffs: P n (x n ; x −n ) for each user n ∈ N , where
and x −n denotes the vector of selected data rates for all users other than user n.
In Game 1, each user n ∈ N selects its rate x n ≥ 0 to maximize its payoff P n (x n ; x −n ). A Nash equilibrium of Game 1 is defined as a non-negative rate vector x * = (x * 1 , . . . , x * N ) such that for each user n ∈ N , we have P n (x * n ; x * −n ) ≥ P n (x n ; x * −n ) for anyx n ≥ 0. In a Nash equilibrium x * , no user n ∈ N can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy x n .
be an optimal solution for Problem 1 and x * be a Nash equilibrium for Game 1 for the same choice of system parameters. The efficiency at Nash equilibrium x * is defined as the ratio of the network aggregate surplus at x * to the network aggregate surplus at x S :
Definition 2: The price-of-anarchy PoA (Game 1, Problem 1) is defined as the worst-case efficiency of a Nash equilibrium of Game 1 among all possible selections of system parameters (i.e., number of users, utility, cost, and price functions) as long as Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. 
From Theorem 1, for any choice of parameters, the network aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium of Game 1 is guaranteed to be at least 2 3 ≈ 67% of the optimal network aggregate surplus. Notice that the PoA indicates how bad the network performance can become due to strategic behavior of the users. In the rest of this paper, we generalize Theorem 1 to the case where some of the users can perform inter-session network coding. We show that such a generalization is non-trivial and the results are drastically different from those in Theorem 1 in several aspects.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME WITH INTER-SESSION NETWORK CODING AND ROUTING FLOWS: THE CASE WITH ZERO COSTS FOR SIDE LINKS
In this section, we reformulate Problem 1 and Game 1 in a network scenario where a bottleneck link is shared not only by routing flows, but also by some inter-session network coding flows.
We then extend the results in Theorem 1 according to a new network resource allocation game.
We show that the new game setting may have multiple Nash equilibria. In addition, the 67% efficiency bound in Theorem 1 is no longer guaranteed. In fact, although the efficiency loss is still bounded, the performance at some Nash equilibria is only 25% of the optimal performance.
A. Problem Formulation
Consider the modified network model in Fig. 2 . The network topology in this figure is called a butterfly network in the network coding literature [5] , [26] . The network in Fig. 2 is similar to the one in Fig. 1 , except that it includes two direct side links (s 1 , t N ) and (s N , t 1 ). In this scenario, the source node of user 1 is located closer to the destination node of user N than to its own destination node (and vice versa). Thus, users 1 and N can perform inter-session network coding. In this setting, we can distinguish two different types of users in the system:
• Network Coding Users: Users 1 and N , who can perform inter-session network coding.
• Routing Users: Users 2, . . . , N − 1, who cannot perform inter-session network coding.
Let X 1 and X N denote packets sent from source nodes s 1 and s N , respectively. Node i can encode packets X 1 and X N jointly, and then send out the resulting encoded packet, denoted by X 1 ⊕ X N , towards node j (and from there towards t 1 and t N ). Given the remedy data X 1 from the side link (s 1 , t N ) and the remedy data X N from the side link (s N , t 1 ), nodes t N and t 1 can decode the encoded packets that they receive. In fact, in this setting, nodes t 1 and t N can decode both X 1 and X N . Clearly, the benefit of network coding is to reduce the traffic load on link (i, j) (thus reducing the cost) while achieving the same data rates compared to the case that no network coding is performed. It is worth mentioning that although the network coding scenario in Fig. 2 For the network in Fig. 2 , the network aggregate surplus maximization problem becomes:
Problem 2 (Surplus Maximization with Network Coding and Zero-Cost Side Links):
subject to x n ≥ 0, n = 1, . . . , N.
Comparing Problems 1 and 2, we can see that the cost term C( N n=1 x n ) in Problem 1 is now replaced by a new cost term C( x N ) ). The intuition behind the objective function in Problem 2 is as follows. Since x 1 and x N are selected independently by users 1 and N , in general, we may have x 1 = x N . Thus, regardless of the choice of an efficient network coding scheme, the intermediate node i can perform network coding only at rate min(x 1 , x N ).
Those packets which are not encoded (e.g., at rate x 1 − min(x 1 , x N ) if x 1 ≥ x N , and at rate
are simply forwarded, leading to an aggregate rate of
. Note that if x 1 = x N , then all packets from users 1 and N are jointly encoded. In fact, this is the case at optimality as the following result suggests:
be an optimal solution for Problem 2. We have
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A. From Theorem 2, users 1 and N should have equal rates at optimality. Notice that since Problem 2 is a convex optimization problem, it can be solved in a centralized fashion using convex programming techniques [28] . Distributed resource allocation can also be done via pricing as explained next.
Following the same pricing scheme as in Section II, the shared link may apply a single price for all (i.e., coded and routed) packets:
Each user n pays x n µ(x). However, this leads to double charging for encoded packets. Note that each encoded packet includes the data from both users 1 and N . Thus, the single pricing model in (5) leads to more payment from the users than the actual link cost. This can be avoided by price discrimination, i.e., charging the routed and network-coded packets with different prices.
Let µ(x) in (5) denote the price to be charged for routed packets. Under the discriminatory pricing scheme, we define another price δ(x) for network coded packets. In general, we have
where 0 < β ≤ 1 is a pricing parameter. If β = 1, then there is only a single price. If β < 1, then the encoded packets are charged less than the routed packets as they carry more information compared to routing packets of the same size. In this paper, we focus on the case of β = . This is the only choice of β that avoids over-or under-charging with two network coding flows.
Based on the this pricing scheme, user 1 pays min(
is, it pays for transmission of its encoded packets at a price of δ(x) and for transmission of its forwarded (not coded) packets at a price of µ(x). From (6), the total payment by user 1 is
A similar payment model applies to user N . Notice that each user n = 2, . . . , N −1 pays x n µ(x).
We are now ready to define a resource allocation game for the network setting in Fig. 2 , when users can anticipate prices µ and δ according to (5) and (6), respectively: • Players: Users in set N .
• Payoffs: Q n (x n ; x −n ) for each user n ∈ N . The network coding users 1 and N have
and each routing user n ∈ N \{1, N } has
Comparing Games 1 and 2, we can see that Game 2 introduces significantly more complex payoff functions. In the rest of this section, we answer the following questions:
1) Does Game 2 always (i.e., for any choice of system parameters) have a Nash equilibrium?
2) If a Nash equilibrium exists for Game 2, is it always unique?
3) What is the worst-case efficiency (i.e., the PoA) at a Nash equilibrium of Game 2?
B. Existence and Non-uniqueness of Nash Equilibria A Nash equilibrium of Game 2 with both routing and inter-session network coding flows can be defined as a data rate selection vector x * 0, where the inequality is coordinate-wise, such that for all users n ∈ N , we have Q n (x * n ; x * −n ) ≥ Q n (x n ; x * −n ) for any choice ofx n ≥ 0.
Theorem 3:
There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in Game 2.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix B. The key to prove Theorem 3 is to apply
Rosen's existence theorem for concave N-person games [29, Theorem 1] . In this regard, we show that for all users n ∈ N , the payoff function Q n (x n ; x −n ) is a concave function with respect to x n , even though Q 1 and Q N are not differentiable due to the max and min functions.
From Theorem 3, the existence of Nash equilibria for the resource allocation game is still guaranteed when network coding is applied. However, as we will see in Section III-C, there can multiple Nash equilibria in this case. This can change the results on efficiency loss and the PoA.
C. Users' Best Responses
The strategic behavior of users can be modeled based on their best responses. In this regard, each user n ∈ N selects its data rate as x B n to maximize its own payoff Q n , given x −n :
Since the problem in (10) is convex, we can readily show the following for routing users.
Proposition 1: For each routing user n ∈ N \{1, N }, the best response x B n (x −n ) is obtained as the value of x n which satisfies the following equation (bounded below by 0):
Recall that the linear pricing parameter a is defined in Assumption 2. The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix C. The key idea is to take the derivative of the payoff Q n (x n ; x −n ) with respect to x n and solve the resulted Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condition [28] .
Obtaining the best response functions for network coding users 1 and N is more complex, mostly due to the non-differentiability of the payoff functions Q 1 (x 1 ; x −1 ) and Q N (x N ; x −N ).
In fact, network coding user 1 should separately examine two scenarios:
(a) Selecting its strategy (data rate) x 1 to be greater than or equal to x N :
(b) Selecting its strategy (data rate) x 1 to be less than or equal to x N :
The intuition behind the objective functions in (12) and (13) is as follows. In (12) , since the strategy of user 1, i.e., its data rate x 1 , is lower bounded by x N , we have: (8) reduces to the objective function in (12) . On the other hand, in (13) , since the data rate x 1 is upper bounded by x N , we have:
Thus, the payoff function Q 1 (x 1 ; x −1 ) in (8) reduces to the objective function in (13) .
. The best response for user N is obtained similarly. We can show the following for network coding users.
Proposition 2: For network coding user 1, the data ratex 
Furthermore, if the utility function
is obtained as the value of x 1 that satisfies the following equation (bounded between 0 and x N )
When the utility function U 1 (x 1 ) is linear (i.e., U 1 (x 1 ) is a constant for all x 1 ≥ 0), we havê
is any value between 0 and x N .
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix D. The key idea is to solve the KKT optimality conditions [28] for the optimization problems in (12) and (13) for user 1 (and N ). We can see that the best responses in Propositions 1 and 2 only depend on the first derivatives of the utility functions. We will use this key observation to characterize the Nash equilibrium in Section III-D.
D. Nash Equilibrium and Price-of-Anarchy
Given the best response functions in Section III-C, we are now ready to characterize the Nash equilibria. Let X * denote the set of all Nash equilibria of Game 2. Recall that set X * has at least one member as shown in Theorem 3. By definition, for any Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X * , given x * −n , the best response for user n ∈ N is the same as its strategy at Nash equilibrium [30] . That is, x B n (x * −n ) = x * n for all n ∈ N . Thus, all Nash equilibria of Game 2 can be obtained using the best response equations in Propositions 1 and 2. Recall from Section III-C that the best responses in (13), (15) , (15) only depend on the first derivatives of the utility functions.
Therefore, for each Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X * , if we define the following linear utility functions:
then x * continues to be a Nash equilibrium for a new game with new utilitiesŪ 1 (
In fact, x * is a Nash equilibrium for the family of games with utility functions
having their first derivatives equal to
at Nash equilibrium, respectively. Theorem 4: For each Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X * of Game 2 and any optimal solution x S of Problem 2, the following inequality holds:
where
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix E. Notice that maxq ≥0 [ σq − C(q) ] denotes the optimal objective value of Problem 2 for the special case of having linear utility functions (see Appendix E). Therefore, for the inequality in (17), the right hand side denotes the efficiency for linear utility functions while the left hand side denotes the efficiency for any utility functions, assuming that the rest of the system parameters (i.e., number of users, cost function, and price functions) are the same. This leads us to the following helpful theorem.
Theorem 5:
The worst-case efficiency at a Nash equilibrium of Game 2 with respect to the optimal solution of Problem 2 occurs when the utility functions are linear for all users. That is,
where utility parameter γ n > 0 for all users n ∈ N .
From Theorem 5, to obtain the PoA for Game 2 for arbitrary choices of utility functions (as long as they satisfy Assumption 1), it is enough to only analyze the case when all utility functions are linear. This key observation can make our analysis significantly more tractable.
Notice that for the case of linear utilities, we have U n (x n ) = γ n for all n ∈ N . As a result, the best responses for all users can be obtained in closed form using Propositions 1 and 2.
Next, we obtain the exact value(s) of the Nash equilibrium(s) and PoA for Game 2.
Theorem 6: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Also assume that the utility functions are linear. Consider the case where N ≥ 2 and let x * denote the Nash equilibrium for Game 2.
Without loss of generality, assume that γ 1 ≥ γ N . For notational simplicity, we also define
(c) If
(d) For any choice of system parameters in (a)-(c), the routing users have the following rates
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix F. γ N −aq * as it results in x * N = 0. We also notice that the Nash equilibrium directly depends on the value of the pricing parameter β.
To study the properties of Nash equilibria of Game 2, we consider two different cases: 1) Two Users Case: Consider the butterfly network in Fig. 2 and assume that N = 2. In this case, the network includes two network coding users and no routing users. We can obtain the Nash equilibria using Theorem 6 by setting q * = 0. The Nash equilibria when β = 1 and
are shown in Fig. 3 (a) and (b), respectively. We can see that the data rates at the Nash equilibria are always less than the optimal rates, except when γ 1 = γ 2 and β = . In addition, in many cases (i.e., γ 1 ≥ 2γ 2 for β = 1 and γ 1 ≥ 3γ 2 for β = ) we have x * 2 < x * 1 . This leads to further deviation from the optimal performance. Recall from Theorem 2 that at optimality, the data rates of users 1 and N should be equal. We can show the following in the two-user case:
Theorem 7: In a network as in Fig. 2 with N = 2, under the single pricing scheme (β = 1),
and under the discriminatory pricing scheme with β = 
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix G. Here, PoA (Game 2, Problem 2) denotes the lowest (i.e., worst-case) ratio of the network aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium of Game 2 Notice that for each routing user n ∈ N \{1, N }, the strategy at Nash equilibrium, i.e., data rate x * n , only depends on q * and x * 1 , but not x * N . In fact, since we have assumed that γN ≤ γ1, we indeed have x * N ≤ x * 1 , as shown in (20)- (22) . Therefore, max(x * 1 , x * N ) = x 2 to the network aggregate surplus at the optimal solution of Problem 2. Theorem 7 extends the results on efficiency bounds for routing flows in Theorem 1 to the case where two inter-session network coding users share a link. We can see that even for this simple scenario, the efficiency bound in Theorem 1 cannot be guaranteed anymore. From Theorem 7, inter-session network coding with no price discrimination can reduce the PoA from 0.67 down to , i.e., users 1 and N split the price of encoded packets, the PoA improves only to 12 25 = 0.48. This implies that inter-session network coding is significantly more sensitive to strategic users. Thus, unlike the case of routing networks, a simple pricing scheme (even with price discrimination) may not be sufficient to encourage cooperation in inter-session network coding systems.
It is worth mentioning that the above results do not imply superiority of routing versus network coding. In fact, we can verify that at any Nash equilibrium of Game 2, the network surplus is higher than or equal to the network surplus at the Nash equilibrium of Game 1 for the same parameters. In other words, non-cooperative network coding results in an absolute performance which is no worse than the absolute performance of non-cooperative routing.
However, the relative performance in non-cooperative network coding compared to optimal cooperative network coding is worse than the relative performance in the routing-only case.
Numerical results on efficiency of the Nash equilibrium of Game 2 for 200 randomly generated scenarios with different choices of system parameters in the two-user case are shown in Fig.   4 . In particular, in each scenario, the utility functions of the users are chosen to be α-fair (cf.
[23]) with a randomly selected utility parameter α ∈ (0, 1). We can see that by using price discrimination with parameter β = 1 2 , the guaranteed worst-case efficiency bound (i.e., the PoA) improves from 0.33 to 0.48. For the rest of this paper, we focus on the case with β = 1 2 . That is, the network coding users split the charge of transmitting their jointly encoded packets.
2) General Case: Next, consider the case where the topology is as in Fig. 2 and there are N > 2 users in the network. The presence of both network coding and routing users makes the analysis more complex. To see this, consider the network in Fig. 2 and assume that N = 3, a = 1,
, γ 1 ≥ γ 3 , γ 3 = 1, and γ 2 = 3. In this case, users 1 and 3 are the network coding users and user 2 is a routing user. From Theorem 6, the Nash equilibria are obtained as shown in Fig.   5 . Comparing the results in Fig. 5 with those in Fig. 3 , we can see that adding an extra routing user forces the network coding users 1 and 3 to reduce their data rates at Nash equilibrium.
However, there still exist multiple (infinite) Nash equilibria when γ 1 and γ 3 are close. It is easy to numerically verify that in this scenario, the worst-case efficiency at Nash equilibrium of Game 2 is 46.5%. Comparing this with the results in Theorem 7, we can expect that adding routing users will further reduce the PoA. In fact, we can show the next theorem in a general case:
Theorem 8: Consider a network coding system as in Fig. 2 and assume that N ≥ 2.
(a) If the price discrimination parameter β = 1 2 , we have
(b) The worst-case efficiency occurs when N → ∞.
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix H. Comparing the results in Theorem 8 with those in Theorems 1 and 7, we can see that a resource allocation game with both network coding and routing users has a worse PoA compared to the routing only and network coding only cases.
IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME WITH INTER-SESSION NETWORK CODING AND ROUTING FLOWS: THE CASE WITH NON-ZERO COSTS FOR SIDE LINKS
In Section III, we considered a network coding scenario in a butterfly network where the side links have zero cost as stated in Assumption 3. In this section, we study the case where the side links have non-zero cost. We show that the results will be noticeably different. In particular, the network coding users are no longer interested in participating in network coding. This can further reduce the efficiency to as low as only 20% of the optimal network coding performance.
A. Problem Formulation
Consider the network in Fig. 6 . In this figure, the side link (s 1 , t N ) has price p 1 and cost C 1 while the side link (s N , t 1 ) has price p N and cost C N . Suppose that Assumption 2 also holds for the price and cost functions of both side links. In addition, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (Non-Zero Cost for Side Links):
The side links (s 1 , t N ) and (s N , t 1 ) in Fig. 6 always have non-zero cost and impose non-zero prices. In particular, the side link (s 1 , t N ) has
Clearly, by sending remedy packets over side link (s 1 , t N ), user 1 is helping user N to decode the encoded packets it may receive. However, due to non-zero cost at the side links, user 1 will be charged for sending these remedy packets. A similar statement is true for user N when it sends remedy packets on the side link (s N , t 1 ). Therefore, users 1 and N may decide to reduce the rate at which they send the remedy packets on the side links, compared to the rate at which they send their own data packets to node i. In other words, they may decide to have partial or no participation in network coding. Users 1 and N can inform node i about their decision using a simple packet marking scheme, e.g., by using a flag in the packet header. Let y 1 and z 1 denote the rate at which source s 1 sends data to node i marked for routing and network coding, respectively.
Similarly, let y N and z N denote the data rate at which source s N sends data to node i marked for routing and network coding, respectively. Node i may jointly encode only those packets which are marked for network coding. If the packet is marked for routing, then node i simply forwards the packet without modifying its content. Furthermore, let v 1 and v N denote the data rates at which sources s 1 and s N send remedy packets on side links (s 1 , t N ) and (s N , t 1 ), respectively.
The routing users 2, . . . , N −1 just send routing packets at rates y 2 , . . . , y N −1 , respectively.
Given the above data rates, intermediate node i encodes packets at rate min(z 1 , z N ) and forwards the rest of packets at rate
As a result, the total rate on link (i, j) becomes 
We can see that the objective function in Problem 3 is more complex than the one in Problem 2 and includes the cost of side links (s 1 , t N ) and (s N , t 1 ).
Following a discriminatory pricing model as in Section III-A, we can define a resource allocation game for the network setting in Fig. 6 , when users are price anticipators:
Game 3: (Resource Allocation Game with Inter-session Network Coding and Routing Flows and Non-zero Costs for Side Links)
• Strategies: Transmission rates y, z, and v.
• Payoffs: W n (·) for each user n ∈ N , where
Here, for each user n ∈ N , we have y −n = (y 1 , . . . , y n−1 , y n+1 , . . . , y N ). Next, we study the efficiency and the worst-case efficiency (i.e., the PoA) at Nash equilibria of Game 3.
B. Users' Best Responses
For network coding user 1, the best response is in form of y
which is obtained as the solution of the following optimization problem
The best response for network coding user N , denoted by y z N ) ). In that case, the payoff function is decreasing in z 1 . A similar statement is true for network coding user N .
C. Nash Equilibrium and Price-of-Anarchy
Given the results on users' best responses in Propositions 3 and 4, we can conclude that at any Nash equilibrium of Game 3, denoted by (y * , z * , v * ), we should indeed have
In other words, at a Nash equilibrium of Game 3, none of the users perform network coding.
In that case, the Nash equilibria of Game 3 would be closely related to the Nash equilibria of Game 1. In fact, for any choice of system parameters, if x * is a Nash equilibrium of Game 1, then y * = x * , z * = 0, and v * = 0 would be a Nash equilibrium of Game 3 for the same choice of system parameters. From this, together with the results in Theorem 1(a), we can conclude that Game 3 always has a unique Nash equilibrium. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 9:
The worst-case efficiency of Game 3 occurs when the utility functions are linear.
The proof of Theorem 9 is similar to that of [8, Lemma 4] . From Theorem 9, to obtain the PoA for Game 3 for arbitrary choices of utility functions (as long as the utility functions satisfy Assumption 1), it is enough to only analyze the case where all utility functions are linear.
Furthermore, we notice that if the side links have a very large cost compared to the cost of the bottleneck link, the optimal performance is achieved if network coding is not applied. In that case, the efficiency can be obtained by using Theorem 1. Notice that in this case, the optimal network aggregate surplus for Problem 3 is the same as the optimal network aggregate surplus for Problem 1. In addition, the network aggregate surplus is the same at the Nash equilibrium of Game 3 and Game 1. However, for general choices of a 1 > 0 and a N > 0, obtaining the PoA requires further investigation of the optimal solution of Problem 3. 
(c) If Theorem 11: Consider a network coding system as in Fig. 6 and assume that N ≥ 2. suggests. As a 1 = a N increases and tends to infinity, Problem 3 becomes equivalent to Problem 1 (in terms of the optimal network aggregate surplus) and Game 3 becomes equivalent to Game 1 (in terms of network aggregate surplus at Nash equilibrium) which leads to an efficiency higher (even infinite) Nash equilibria in the resulting resource allocation game. This is in sharp contrast to a similar game setting with traditional packet forwarding where the Nash equilibrium is always unique. Furthermore, we showed that the efficiency loss can be significantly more severe than for the case without network coding. The precise values of the PoA and the efficiency loss depend on the pricing scheme used by the links. Compared with the traditional single pricing approach, a novel discriminatory pricing, which charges encoded and forwarded packets differently can improve efficiency. However, regardless of the discriminatory pricing scheme being used, the PoA is still worse than for the case when network coding is not applied. This implies that, although inter-session network coding can improve performance compared to routing, it is significantly more sensitive to users' strategic behaviors. For example, in a butterfly network when the side links have zero cost, the efficiency at certain Nash equilibria can be as low as 25%. If the side links have non-zero cost, then the efficiency at some Nash equilibria further reduces to only 20%. These results generalize the well-known result of guaranteed 67% worst-case efficiency,
shown by Johari and Tsitsiklis in [8] for traditional packet forwarding networks. This motivates our ongoing work of mechanism design to encourage the strategic users to perform network coding, e.g., by using a combination of reward and punishment in a dynamic game setting.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 2
Letx = (x 1 , . . . ,x N ) denote any arbitrary feasible solution for Problem 2 such thatx 1 =x N .
Without loss of generality, we assume thatx 1 >x N . We then definex = (x 1 , . . . ,x N ) as another feasible solution such thatx n =x n for all n ∈ N \{1, N } andx 1 =x N = max(x 1 ,x N ) =x 1 .
Since for all users, the utility functions are strictly increasing in transmission rates, we have
On the other hand, since max(
From (35) and (36), the feasible solutionx results in strictly higher network aggregate surplus compared tox. Thus, vectorx cannot be an optimal solution for Problem 2.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for Game 2 by using Rosen's existence theorem for N -person games [29, Theorem 1] . In this regard, we need to show that for each user n ∈ N , the payoff function Q n is continuous and concave in data rate x n . This is not trivial, particularly for network coding users due to the complexity of the payoff functions.
For user 1, givenx −1 = (x 2 , . . . ,x N ), we can rewrite the payoff function Q 1 as
and
is concave. We need to show that for eachx 1 ≥ 0 andx 1 ≥ 0 and for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we have
Without loss of generality, we assume thatx 1 ≤x 1 . We notice that ifx 1 ≤x 1 ≤x N orx N ≤ x 1 ≤x 1 , then (38) is directly obtained from the fact that G 1 and H 1 are concave. Thus, we only consider the case wherex 1 ≤x N ≤x 1 . We consider two different scenarios for choice of θ:
If (39) holds, then θx 1 + (1 − θ)x 1 ≤x N . In addition, sincex 1 ≥x N , we have
From (41) and (42), we have
Therefore,
where the second line results from concavity of G 1 , the third line results from the fact that
, the fourth line results from (43), and the fifth line is due to
. Next assume that (40) holds. In that case, θx 1 + (1 − θ)x 1 ≥x N .
In addition, sincex 1 ≤x N , we have
From (45) and (46), we have
Therefore, we can show that
From (44) and (48), payoff Q 1 (x 1 ,x −1 ) always satisfies (38). Thus,
Similarly, we can show that Q N (x N ,x −N ) is continuous and concave. The same statement is evidently true for all n ∈ N \{1, N }. Thus, Game 2 is a concave N-person game and the existence of Nash equilibria follows from the Rosen's existence theorem [29, Theorem 1].
C. Proof of Proposition 1
For each user n ∈ N \{1, N }, the KKT optimality conditions for problem (10) become
and λ n x n = 0. Here, λ n ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to inequality constraint x n ≥ 0. If x n > 0, then λ n = 0 and (49) reduces to (11) . Otherwise, (11) cannot hold for any positive x n and we have x n = 0. Recall that the best response is bounded below by zero.
D. Proof of Proposition 2
For user 1, we can write the KKT optimality conditions for optimization problem (12) as
and λ 1 (x 1 − x N ) = 0. Here, λ 1 ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint
, then λ 1 = 0 and (50) reduces to (14) . Otherwise, x 1 takes its lower bound value, i.e., x 1 = x N . It is also easy to verify that (15) is simply the KKT condition for convex optimization problem (13) , as long as the utility function U 1 (x 1 ) is non-linear (i.e., concave, but not linear). Therefore, it should hold for user 1's best response data rate. If the utility function
is linear, then the objective function in optimization problem (13) becomes
In this case, the best response depends on the sign of the multiplier term U 1 (x 1 ) − βa( N −1 n=2 x n + x N ) as explained in Proposition 2.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
At Nash equilibrium of Game 2, we have x B n (x * −n ) = x * n for all users n ∈ N . From this, together with (11), (14) , and (15) and also due to β ≤ 1, we can show that
That is, the network aggregate surplus is always non-negative at any Nash equilibrium of Game 2. On the other hand, using concavity of the utility functions, for each user n ∈ N , we have
Again, by concavity,
. Applying this to all users n ∈ N , we have
For notational simplicity, we define
We notice that
whereq is an auxiliary variable, the equality results from Theorem 2, the first inequality is due to the definition of σ, and the second inequality results from (55). Clearly, Therefore, we can conclude that maxq ≥0 [σq − C(q)] is indeed equal to the optimal objective value of Problem 2 for the special case of having linear utility functions. Finally, from (53)-(56),
where the third line results from (53), the fourth line results from (56), and the last line results from (52), (54), and (56) and also the fact that maxq ≥0 [σq − C(q)] is always non-negative.
F. Proof of Theorem 6
We notice that since the utility functions are linear, we have: U n (·) = γ n for all n ∈ N . Next, we prove that due to γ 1 ≥ γ N , we should always have x * 1 ≥ x * N . To show thus, assume that x * 1 < x * N . Since U 1 (x 1 ) = γ 1 , from Proposition 2, the inequality x * 1 < x * N implies that
Furthermore, since U N (x N ) = γ N , from (14) and after reordering the terms, we have
From (58), (59), and due to γ N ≤ γ 1 , it is required that
If β = 1, then the inequality in (60) reduces to x * N ≤ 0 which contradicts the assumption that x * N > x * 1 ≥ 0. On the other hand, if 0 < β < 1, then we can further show that
where the last (strict) inequality results from the assumption that x * N > x * 1 . It is clear that (61) contradicts (60). Thus, for any 0 < β ≤ 1, the data rate x * N cannot be greater than x * 1 and we always have x * N ≤ x * 
From (62) and (63),
This implies that
However, this contradicts the assumption in this scenario that
we indeed have x * 1 = x * N . From this, together with Proposition 2, we have
Notice that the transmission rates are non-negative. Thus, the best responses are as in (20) .
Part (b):
We first notice that the condition in this scenario holds if and only if
On the other hand, since γ 1 ≤ 
Replacing (70) in (69), we have
Case II) Assume that x * N = 0. In that case, from Proposition 2, we have
Replacing (72) in (73), we have
From (74) and knowing that γ 1 ≤ 2 β γ N − aq * , it is required that
Thus, in both Case I and Case II, the best responses are as in (21) .
Part (c): We consider two cases:
Case I) Assume that x * 1 > x N . In that case, (62) and (63) hold. First, assume that γ N = βaq * + βax *
Replacing this in (62), the data rate for user N is obtained as
where the inequality results from the fact that γ 1 ≥ 2 β γ N − aq * . Clearly, since the data rates are non-negative, the above implies that x * N = 0. Replacing this in (62), we have
Next, assume that (63) holds as a strict inequality. That is,
Replacing this in (62), the data rate model in (22) is obtained.
Case II) Assume that x * 1 = x * N . In that case, from Proposition 2, we have
From (79) and (80) and since by assumption γ 1 ≥ 2 β γ N − aq * , it is required that
Thus, either x * 1 = x * N = 0 and γ 1 = aq * or β = 1 and γ 1 = 2ax * 1 + aq * . In the latter case,
In addition, from Proposition 2, we have
From (82) and (83), x * 1 = x * N = 0 and γ 1 = aq * . Clearly, these results satisfy (22) .
For each node n ∈ N \{1, N }, at each Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X * of Game 2, it is
Thus, in case of having linear utility functions, the derivative of the objective function in problem (11) with respect to variable x n is obtained as γ n −a (q
, the derivative is always non-positive and the objective function is decreasing in data rate x n . In that case, x * n = 0. Otherwise, i.e., if γ n ≥ a (q * + x * 1 ), then since the objective function is convex, we have x * n = γn a − q * − x * 1 . Together, these two cases result in (23).
G. Proof of Theorem 7
We first obtain the optimal solution of Problem 2 when N = 2. Since Problem 2 is convex, we can use the KKT optimality conditions and confirm that the optimal data rates are
Thus, at optimality, the network aggregate surplus becomes
Next, we examine the efficiency for all the scenarios in Theorem 6(a), (b), (c), where q * = 0 as there is no routing user in the network. First, we assume that
From Theorem 6(a), the Nash equilibria are as in (20) . Since there are multiple Nash equilibria, the worst-case efficiency for Game 2 is obtained by solving the following optimization problem
Problem (87) is a concave minimization (not maximization) problem. Thus, the optimality occurs at one of the boundary points. That is, either at
. The derivative of the objective function in Problem (87) with respect to x * 1 can be written as
The sign of the derivative in (88) depends on the choice of parameter β. We assume that and β = 1. From (86), we have
where the last inequality is due to constraint x * 1 ≤ . In this case, the efficiency ratio becomes
For the ease of exposition, we define Γ = 1 1+γ 2 /γ 1 . Since γ 1 ≥ γ 2 , we have
On the other hand, from the lower and upper bounds in problem (87), we also have
Thus, the worst-case efficiency is obtained by solving the following problem over variable Γ:
The derivative of the objective function in problem (92) can be obtained as
On the other hand, we can show that
Thus, the derivative in (93) is always positive and minimum efficiency occurs at the lower bound
. Therefore, the worst-case efficiency when (86) holds is obtained as
If β = 1, then (95) becomes
On the other hand, if β = , then (95) becomes 6/9 − 1/9 = 5/9 ≈ 0.556.
Next, we assume that β < 1 and
From Theorem 6, the data rates of users 1 and 2 at Nash equilibrium are as in (21) where q * = 0.
Assuming that γ 2 is fixed, the worst-case efficiency is obtained by solving the following problem
The derivative of the objective function in (99) can be obtained as
If β = and (98) holds is obtained as
Finally, we assume that
From Theorem 6(c), the Nash equilibrium is as in (22) and the worst-case efficiency is obtained by solving the following optimization problem
The objective function in problem (104) is decreasing in γ 2 . Thus, the minimum occurs at upper-bound γ 2 = β 2 γ 1 . The worst-case efficiency when (103) holds is obtained as
On the other hand, if β = 
This concludes the proof.
H. Proof of Theorem 8
Using the KKT optimality conditions, the optimal network aggregate surplus, i.e., the optimal solution of Problem 2, for linear utilities is obtained as σ 2 /(2a). Next, we study two cases:
Case I) We assume that γ 1 + γ N = σ. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7, here we obtain the PoA by examining all the scenarios in Theorem 6(a), (b), (c). First, assume that
In that case, Nash equilibrium is obtained as in (20) . We notice that 0 By (111)
To obtain the worst-case efficiency for this scenario, we need to solve the following problem minimize
subject to γ n = a (q
Here, γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ N ) denotes the vector of utility parameters for all users. We assume, without loss of generality, that γ n = a(q * + x * n + x * 1 ) for all users n ∈ N \{1, N }. In fact, if for a feasible efficiency, we have x * n > 0 for some n ∈ N \{1, N }, then this assumption simply implies constraint (114). On the other hand, if for a feasible efficiency, we have x * n = 0 for some n ∈ N \{1, N }, then assuming γ n = a(q * + x * n + x * 1 ) does not have any impact on the objective function as the term γ n x * n = 0, regardless of the value of γ n . Therefore, we can restrict our attention only to those feasible solutions for which we have γ n = a(q * + x * n + x * 1 ) for all n = 2, . . . , N − 1. Having done so, to solve problem (113)-(122), we first assume that all variables, except for x 1 = x N , are fixed. The derivative of the objective function in (113) with respect to variable x 1 is obtained as
For any 1 2 ≤ β ≤ 1 and due to the fact that
. By adding −a(q * + x * 1 ) to both sides of this inequality, we have
By (110) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the derivative in (123) is always non-negative and the worst-case efficiency occurs at
. From this, together with (114), for each n = 2, . . . , N − 1,
Thus, the objective function in (113) becomes
On the other hand, after reordering the terms, constraint (119) becomes
The right hand side in (127) is non-negative. In fact, since σ ≥ γ 1 and due to (118), we have
Replacing ( 
Problem (129)- (136) is symmetric in x * 2 , . . . , x * N . Therefore, the worst-case efficiency occurs when at Nash equilibrium we have
From (135) and (127), it is required that
By replacing (137) in (129), the objective function in (129) reduces to
The objective function in (139) is increasing in N and constraint (138) becomes less restrictive as N increases. Thus, the worst-case efficiency occurs as N → ∞. We also notice that
On the other hand, as N → ∞, constraint (138) becomes 0
. However, we already know that this constraint always holds as shown in (126). Thus, we can simply eliminate this constraint. By replacing (140) in (139), the objective function becomes
For notational simplicity, we defineq * = aq * . After reordering the terms, (141) becomes
By looking at the remaining constraints, we can see that constraint (118) can be written as
Given the definition ofq * and by combining constraints (117) and (120), we also have
Next, we take the derivative of the objective function in (142) with respect to γ 1 which yeilds
where the last inequality is due to σ ≥ γ 1 andq * ≥ 0. Since the derivative is non-negative, the worst-case efficiency occurs at the lower bound of γ 1 . Comparing constraints (143) and (144),
If (146) holds, problem (129)- (136) becomes
On the other hand, if (147) holds, problem (129)- (136) becomes
subject to 0 ≤q
The objective function in (148) is increasing inq * , while the objective function in (150) is decreasing inq * . Thus, for both optimization problems (148)- (149) and (150)- (151), the worstcase efficiency occurs atq * = σ 2
. Exploiting this in (148) and (150), the worst-case efficiency when γ 1 + γ N = σ and inequalities (110) and (111) hold is obtained as
Interestingly, the worst-case efficiency in this scenario does not depend on the choice of pricing parameter β. Next, assume that condition (110) holds and we have
From Theorem 6(a), the Nash equilibria are obtained as 0
. We can show that, in this scenario, the worst-case efficiency occurs if N → ∞ and we have x * 1 = x * N = 0 and
. Thus, the worst-case efficiency when (110) and (153) hold is obtained as
Details are omitted for brevity. Notice that if β = , then (154) becomes 4 11 ≈ 0.36.
Next, we assume that
From Theorem 6(b), at Nash equilibrium we have
. We can show that the worst-case efficiency when (155) holds is again as in (154). Finally, we assume
In that case, from Theorem 6, if γ ≥ aq * , then
and x * N = 0. On the other hand, if γ ≤ aq * , then x * 1 = x * N = 0. In either case, the worst-case efficiency is still obtained as in (154). Case II) We assume that γ 1 + γ N < σ. Without loss of generality, we also assume that γ 2 = σ.
In that case, we can show that the worst-case efficiency in this scenario becomes
In fact, the results in this case are similar to the results in Theorem 1 (see [8, Theorem 3] 
I. Proof of Theorem 10
We first notice that at optimality, we always have z
This can be easily proved by contradiction. Therefore, we can rewrite the objective function of Problem 3 as
The above objective function is concave in y 1 , . . . , y N . Using KKT optimality conditions, we can show that for each n ∈ N \M we have x S n = 0 and for each n ∈ M, we have
otherwise. 
which is concave in z 1 . Thus, at optimality, we have z
We can show that in this case, optimality occurs when γmax a ≥ z 1 . Replacing (161) in (160), the objective function becomes
which is concave in z 1 . Thus,
By replacing (164) in (161), the data rates in (32) are resulted.
Part (c): Again, we can show that in this case, optimality occurs when γmax a ≥ z 1 . The objective function is the same as that in (163). However, since γ 1 + γ N ≤ γ max , at optimality we have
Replacing this in (161), the data rates in (33) are obtained.
J. Proof of Theorem 11
From (30), and given the payoff functions in Game 3, for each user n ∈ N , we have
First assume that
In that case, from (31), the maximum network aggregate surplus becomes (γ 1 + γ N ) 2 /(2(a + a 1 + a N )). The worst-case efficiency is obtained by solving the following optimization problem
Since the objective function in (167) is increasing in a 1 > 0 and a N > 0, the minimum occurs if a 1 → 0 and a N → 0. We can also assume, without loss of generality, that γ n = aq * + ay * n for each n ∈ N . By replacing (168) 
subject to
Problem (175)- (181) is symmetric in y * 2 , . . . , y * N −1 . Thus, the worst-case efficiency occurs if 
Problem (183)- (185) is symmetric in y 1 and y N . In fact, we can show that the worst-case efficiency occurs at y *
. Replacing this in the objective function in (183), the worst-case efficiency when (166) holds is obtained as
We can also show that if γ max ≤ γ 1 + γ N ≤ 1 + a 1 +a N a γ max or γ max ≥ γ 1 + γ N , then the worst-case efficiency is equal or higher (i.e., better) than 1 5 . In particular, if γ max ≥ γ 1 + γ N , then the worst-case efficiency is 2 3 which resembles the results in [8] . Details are omitted here for brevity. In summary, we have PoA (Game 3, Problem 3)
This concludes the proof. Reference [8] This Paper † Here, the PoA for the network coding scenario with zero side link costs is calculated based on the assumption that we use price discrimination with parameter β = 0.5. If single pricing is used, i.e., if β = 1, then the PoA can be less (i.e., worse) than 1 4 , as discussed in Theorem 7. N Set of all users in the network.
N
Number of all users in the network.
sn, tn
Transmitter and receiver nodes of user n ∈ N , respectively.
(i, j) Shared bottleneck link between intermediate nodes i and j.
xn Data rate of user n ∈ N in the networks in Figs. 1 and 2.
x−n Vector of data rates of all users other than user n in the networks in Figs. 1 and 2 .
x Vector of data rates of all users in the networks in Figs. 1 and 2 .
Un(·)
Utility function of user n ∈ N .
γn Slope of linear utility function of user n ∈ N .
C(·)
Cost function of shared bottleneck link (i, j).
p(·)
Price function of shared bottleneck link (i, j). 
Pn
Payoff function of user n ∈ N in Game 1.
Qn
Payoff function of user n ∈ N in Game 2.
x S Optimal solution for Problems 1 and 2.
x * Nash equilibrium for Games 1 and 2.
x B n (·) Best response data rate for user n ∈ N in Games 1 and 2.
X1, XN
Packets/symbols sent from source nodes s1 and sN , respectively.
X1 ⊕ XN Packet/symbol obtained by joint encoding of packets/symbols X1 and XN .
C1(·), CN (·)
Cost functions of side links (s1, tN ) and (sN , t1) in the network in Fig. 6 .
p1(·), pN (·)
Price functions of side links (s1, tN ) and (sN , t1) in the network in Fig. 6 .
a1, aN
Price parameters, p1(q) = a1q and pN (q) = aN q.
yn Data rate for routed packets of user n ∈ N in the network in Fig. 6 .
z1, zN
Data rate for encoded packets of users 1 and N on link (i, j) in the network in Fig. 6 .
v1, vN
Data rate for remedy packets of users 1 and N on the side links in the network in Fig. 6 .
y −n Vector of data rates for routed packets of all users other than user n in the network in Fig. 6 .
Wn
Payoff function of user n ∈ N in Game 3. unit of data rate incurs at cost of C( P N n=1 xn) and imposes price p( P N n=1 xn). Elastic data rates x1, . . . , xN are selected by users 1, . . . , N , respectively. Fig. 2 . A butterfly network (cf. [5] , [26] ) with a single bottleneck link shared by N flows from N users and two side links.
Transmission of packets over bottleneck link at each unit of data rate incurs at cost of C " P N −1 n=2 xn + max(x1, xN )
" and imposes a price p " P N −1 n=2 xn + max(x1, xN ) " . Since the source node s1 of user 1 is located closer to the destination node tN of user N (and vice versa), users 1 and N can jointly perform inter-session network coding and reduce the traffic load on the shared bottleneck link (i, j) (and reduce cost C). The side links (s1, tN ) and (sN , t1) are assumed to be free of charge in this setting. Here, x1 and xN denote the data rates of source nodes s1 and sN , respectively. On the other hand, X1 and XN denote the actual packets/symbols sent from nodes s1 and sN , respectively. The notation X1 ⊕ XN indicates a network coded packet/symbol obtained by jointly encoding packets X1 and XN . . The rest of the parameters are as follows: a = 1, γ1 ≥ γ2, and γ2 = 1. If γ1 and γ2 are close (e.g., γ2 ≤ γ1 ≤ 2γ2 for β = 1 and γ2 ≤ γ1 ≤ 3γ2 for β = and 2 is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, in this case, there is an infinite number of Nash equilibria. Recall from Theorem 1(a) that in Game 1, i.e., the resource allocation with routing-only users, the Nash equilibrium is unique. This is one of the key differences between Game 1 and Game 2. Efficiency at Nash Equilibrium of Game 2, β = 1 Efficiency at Nash Equilibrium of Game 2, β = 0.5 PoA(Game 2, Problem 2), β = 1 PoA(Game 2, Problem 2), β = 0.5 Fig. 4 . Efficiency at a Nash equilibrium of 200 randomly generated resource allocation game scenarios when the network topology is as in Fig. 2 and the number of users N = 2. Notice that for each scenario, the efficiency is obtained as the ratio of the network aggregate surplus at Nash equilibrium of Game 2 and the network aggregate surplus at optimal solution of Problem 2. Here, we set either β = 1 or β = , where β is the price discriminating parameter. For each scenario, the pricing parameter a ∈ (0, 10) is selected randomly. The utility functions U1 and U2 are chosen to be α-fair (cf. [23] ) with randomly selected choices of utility parameter α ∈ (0, 1). Note that the PoA is defined as the worst-case efficiency. We can see that if β = 1, the PoA is equal to , then the PoA is equal to 12 25 = 0.48. These results confirm Theorem 7. , γ1 ≥ γ3, γ3 = 1, and γ2 = 3.
Users 1 and 3 jointly perform inter-session network coding and user 2 is a routing user: (a) Transmission rates for users 1 and 3, (b) Transmission rates for user 2. If γ1 ≤ 2, then γ2 ≥ γ1 + γ3. In that case, at optimality of Problem 2, link (i, j) should only carry the packets from routing user 2. If γ1 > 2, then γ2 < γ1 + γ3. In that case, at optimality, link (i, j) should only carry the packets from network coding users 1 and 3. and (sN , t1) have non-zero cost. Thus, users 1 and N need to pay for their transmissions over links (s1, tN ) and (sN , t1), respectively. Here, y1 and z1 denote the data rate at which source s1 sends data to intermediate node i marked for routing and network coding, respectively. Similarly, yN and zN denote the data rate at which source sN sends data to node i marked for routing and network coding, respectively. Node i jointly encodes only those packets which are marked for network coding. On the other hand, v1 and vN denote the data rates at which sources s1 and sN send remedy packets over side links (s1, tN ) and (sN , t1), respectively. The routing users 2, . . . , N − 1 send packets to node i all marked for routing with rates y2, . . . , yN−1, respectively. Notation X1 ⊕ XN indicates a network coded packet/symbol obtained by jointly encoding packets X1 and XN . for all n ∈ N \{1, N }, and a = 1. Side link price parameters a1 = aN vary from 0 (non-inclusive) to 10. Notice that for each choice of parameters a1 = aN , the efficiency is obtained as the ratio of the network surplus at Nash equilibrium of Game 3 and the network surplus at optimal solution of Problem 3. We can see that the worst-case efficiency in this case is equal to 1 5 , as expected from Theorem 11. As the prices on the side links increase, network coding becomes less beneficial and the efficiency increases to a value (in this case 4 5 = 0.8) which is higher than 2 3 , as expected from Theorem 1. Efficiency at Nash Equilibrium of Game 3 PoA(Game 3, Problem 3) Fig. 8 . Efficiency at Nash equilibrium of 200 randomly generated resource allocation game scenarios when the network topology is as in Fig. 6 and where N = 2. For each scenario, the pricing parameters a ∈ (0, 10), a1 ∈ (0, 5), and a2 ∈ (0, 5) are selected randomly. The utility functions U1 and U2 are chosen to be α-fair (cf. [23] ) with randomly selected choices of utility parameter α ∈ (0, 1). Note that the PoA is defined as the worst-case efficiency. We can see that the efficiency of Game 3 is always lower bounded by 1 5 = 0.2, i.e., the PoA is 1 5 , as expected from Theorem 11.
